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PREFACE 
t has been my privilege over the past year to chair the CEPS Task Force 
on future mechanisms with a view to providing policy 
recommendations to those involved in shaping a future climate change 
regime and to stakeholders. In doing so, I owe particular appreciation to 
the members of the Task Force, drawn from a wide range of businesses, 
industries, research centres and environmental NGOs, who gave their 
expertise and time, presenting the viewpoints of different interests. The 
Task Force also benefited from the contributions and advice from European 
Commission and member state officials who generously shared their 
expertise and reflections, helping us t o  r e m a i n  f o c u s e d  o n  w h a t  s o o n  
became a rapidly emerging agenda. Last, but not least, we were fortunate 
to be able to always count on CEPS support throughout the Task Force.  
T h i s  C E P S  T a s k  F o r c e  R e p o r t  h a s  b e e n  a b l e  t o  c o n s i d e r  b o t h  t h e  
current operation and the continuation of the Kyoto mechanisms and well 
as the possibilities through the Bali Action Plan for introducing new 
mechanisms and tradable units after 2012, i.e. the first commitment period 
of the Kyoto Protocol. In order to help both ourselves and our readers 
better understand these issues, we have developed a set of criteria against 
which to compare the potential mechanism options.  
From our discussions, we have little doubt that flexible mechanisms 
will play crucial roles in not only facilitating a post-2012 agreement 
between Parties but also inspiring a wide range of actions to implement the 
agreement. Like the current climate change regime, subsequent periods will 
witness the co-existence of multiple mechanisms that can be run in parallel 
or in combination. These can, in time, lead to the development of a global 
carbon market. Existing and new flexible mechanisms are also expected to 
provide a focus for the major levels of business investment required to 
support any post-2012 agreement.  
I ii | PREFACE 
Discussions were always rich, the debate was at times intense and I 
am sure that this Task Force has improved the understanding of the 
existing and new flexible mechanisms in the run up to Copenhagen in 
December 2009 and to a new international climate change agreement. I 
hope that whilst answering some of the outstanding questions, this report 
will further stimulate thinking on and the development of post-2012 
mechanisms that can contribute to significant environmental as well as 
economic benefits.  
 
Ulrika Raab 
Chair of the CEPS Task Force  
Senior Advisor, Swedish Energy Agency 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
n the UN negotiations on climate change, participating governments 
have explored the possibility to introduce new flexible mechanisms in 
support of a future international climate change regime. These include, 
among others, sectoral crediting, sectoral trading, Nationally Appropriate 
Mitigation Actions (NAMAs) and Reduction of Emissions from 
Deforestation and forest Degradation (REDD). Meanwhile, there has been 
continuous discussion on reform of the Clean Development Mechanism 
(CDM) and Joint Implementation (JI) – and their several variations. This 
report considers and compares the relative merits of a selection of these 
proposed mechanisms on the basis of their compliance with a set of 
selected objectives. Its findings and recommendations are aimed at 
international negotiators as well as at EU stakeholders (including business) 
with a view to contributing to the discussions on existing and new flexible 
mechanisms. 
The basic assumption is that flexible mechanisms will play a crucial 
role not only in facilitating a positive outcome in the UN climate 
negotiations, but will also inspire a wide range of actions on their own. 
Moreover, they are expected to provide a focus on business investment. 
Like the current climate change regime, subsequent periods will witness 
the co-existence of multiple mechanisms that can run concurrently or in 
combination with one another.  
This report first outlines the various motives attributed to the 
different stakeholders behind the flexible mechanisms and takes stock of 
the experience acquired with the existing mechanisms under the Kyoto 
Protocol. We then explore four mechanisms (reformed CDM, reformed JI, 
sectoral crediting and sectoral trading) and compare these options against 
three sets of objectives: environmental integrity, enhanced investment and 
institutional strength at the international level (e.g. integrity of mechanisms 
I 2 | EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
with the overall architecture, compatibility between mechanisms and 
coherence of the framework).  
This report is written in non-technical language with the aim of 
addressing a wide range of stakeholders. It focuses on key issues such as 
‘motivations’, ‘mechanism options’, ‘lessons’ and ‘objectives’, while fully 
recognising the importance of other issues not covered here.  
I.  Key messages 
1.  There are different motivations behind flexible mechanisms. 
Although recognising that there are additional driving forces behind the 
proposed mechanisms, the Task Force members concluded that the options 
under consideration have been princ i p a l l y  s h a p e d  b y  f o u r  m a j o r  
motivations: reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, developing a 
carbon market, diffusing technology and substantially increasing the 
magnitude of financing. This array of motivations implies that it may not 
be sufficient to simply reform existing mechanisms but that they will need 
to be supplemented with new ones. The availability of new flexible 
mechanisms will most likely encourage countries to take on more stringent 
levels of commitments than they could by their own efforts alone, thereby 
facilitating the conclusion of a global comprehensive agreement. Moreover, 
flexible mechanisms can be regarded as a catalyst to re-direct financial and 
investment flows to a range of mitigation opportunities across sectors and 
activities. While there is a call, particularly from the EU and some 
stakeholders, to move from pure offsetting to crediting in order to scale up 
global emissions reductions, ultimately achieving the climate objective will 
depend on the level of international commitments undertaken as well as on 
the nature or design of any flexible mechanism finally devised. 
For developing countries, it is important that existing and new 
mechanisms allow growth and development to continue in a robust and 
environmentally-sound manner, through incremental investment from 
Annex I countries and businesses. They should also lead to credits that are 
redeemable in the external market. 
2.  Supply and demand need to be balanced. 
The impact of flexible mechanisms on GHG emissions reductions depends 
on the balance between the supply of and demand for credits and the 
resulting price level in the carbon market. An increase in the supply needs FLEXIBLE MECHANISMS IN SUPPORT OF A NEW CLIMATE CHANGE REGIME | 3 
 
to be balanced by an increase in demand; otherwise, the carbon price and 
incentives to reduce emissions would be eroded.  
The Kyoto Protocol and its reduction commitments were agreed in 
1997, several years before the development of the structure and subsequent 
operation of the carbon market. It is now clearly recognised that transition 
economies will  accrue a significant surplus of AAUs resulting from the 
base year specified in the Kyoto Protocol. The magnitude of the resulting 
surplus of AAUs, compared to actual emissions levels, has been 
estimated at up to 10 billion tonnes. If some or this entire surplus were to 
be introduced into the carbon market, it could have a major impact on the 
market, including the reformed and new UN market mechanisms, which 
are the subject of this report. This topic was not discussed in detail in the 
Task Force but the potential negative effect of surplus AAUs on the carbon 
market has been identified in discussions within the European Union.  
3.  There are many lessons to be learned from existing mechanisms. 
To date, most of the lessons from existing mechanisms have been learned 
by taking stock of the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). 
Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). The CDM has achieved a 
number of important benefits: GHG emissions reductions and sustainable 
development in non-Annex countries; first steps towards MRV 
(measurement, reporting and verification) and GHG accounting; 
participation of the private sector; investment flows to developing 
countries; raising awareness of abatement opportunities; and revenue 
generation. Areas for further discussion include the uneven distribution of 
projects, preferential treatment for Least Developed Countries (LDCs), 
additionality, administrative and organisational issues, offsetting and 
technology transfer. Two areas subject to ongoing improvement are: 
Programmes of Activities (PoAs) and sectoral benchmarking in the CDM.  
Joint Implementation (JI). JI started more recently and operates on a 
smaller scale. Simplification of procedures and relative flexibility in scope 
and process contributed to a considerable increase in the number of JI 
projects under the Track I. Some areas for discussion and ongoing 
improvements are similar to those under the CDM: simplification of 
baseline setting and extension of the scope. 
Assigned Amount Unit (AAU) trading/Green Investment Scheme (GIS). 
The design of AAU trading system has been left to participating Annex I 
countries. One form of AAU trading is the GIS, a scheme that attempts to 4 | EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
finance environmental measures with revenues from the sale of surplus 
AAUs. The GIS has less history and operates on a smaller scale. Among the 
most critical issues are double-counting of units, a host country’s capacity 
to run the scheme, enforcement of its pledge to implement environmental 
measures and transparency in AAU transactions.  
4.  Options for future mechanisms exist. 
Like existing mechanisms, flexible mechanisms in future would aim to 
contribute to advancing climate objectives, i.e. achieving real global 
emissions reductions and possibly other specific objectives such as 
sustainable development, technology transfer and financing.  
CDM. Programmes of Activities (PoAs) are a programmatic version 
of the CDM, registering a set of activities of the same type under a single 
umbrella. Sectoral benchmarking in the CDM credits emissions reductions 
below the baseline based on a pre-determined benchmark for a sector or a 
sub-sector. Expansion of the scope to sectoral and programmatic activities 
could help to strengthen the CDM and address more mitigation 
opportunities. On the other hand, an increase in the number of CDM 
projects would require improvements in efficiency of administration and 
an increase in the transparency of governance.  
JI. To become an optimally functioning mechanism, JI must deal with 
administrative and organisational issues pertaining to the Joint 
Implementation Supervisory Committee (JISC) as well as more technical 
issues such as baseline setting and methodology choices.  
Sectoral crediting. A sectoral crediting mechanism credits emissions 
reductions from a covered sector against a threshold well below the 
‘business as usual’ scenario. If the mechanism is based on a ‘no-lose’ target, 
the threshold can be regarded as an artificial target without binding 
consequences.  Sectoral crediting could set a price signal for a broader part 
of the economy, including power and key industry sectors. A technical 
merit is its circumvention of the additionality test problems on a project 
basis. There are several challenges: preventing double-counting, setting the 
boundaries of the sector, establishing the baseline that is substantiated by 
data collection and incorporates the specific circumstances of a country, 
sector, or technology; and upgrading technical and institutional capacity. 
For baseline setting, it is worth mentioning that in some non-Annex I 
countries many of the industries to be covered are either owned or 
operated by governments. Several questions remain open to debate: i) 
Should credits be issued directly to companies in sectors or channelled FLEXIBLE MECHANISMS IN SUPPORT OF A NEW CLIMATE CHANGE REGIME | 5 
 
through the government? ii) Can sectoral crediting based on no-lose targets 
co-exist with the current CDM or other flexible mechanisms? iii) Will the 
mechanism be structured to encourage upfront private sector investment? 
Sectoral trading. Sectoral trading is a cap-and-trade scheme applied to 
a whole sector or a sub-sector within a country. The scheme is aimed at 
countries that are not yet ready to take on binding national targets but are 
prepared to take on binding targets in key sectors such as power and 
industry. If the government has taken on a binding target for the sector, the 
sectoral cap-and-trade scheme would be mandatory in principle. In 
addition to environmental integrity and involvement of the private sector, 
the benefit of sectoral trading is the possible creation of a level playing 
field, which is a decisive factor for energy-intensive industry that is 
competing globally irrespective of Annex I/non-Annex I country borders. 
Some challenges are similar to those of sectoral crediting: boundary setting 
and consideration given to specific circumstances of a country, a sector or a 
technology in baseline setting.  
5.  Mechanisms can be compared according to at least three objectives 
environmental integrity, enhanced public and private investment and 
institutional strength at an international level. 
The Task Force has formulated three sets of objectives that any reformed or 
new mechanism should meet: environmental integrity, enhanced 
investment and institutional strength at an international level. These three 
objectives are considered to be common to the four mechanism options – 
reformed CDM, reformed JI, sectoral crediting and sectoral trading – 
although their relevance may vary from one option to another. While there 
are other equally important objectives, such as contributing to sustainable 
development, competitiveness and a level-playing field, the latter of which 
is immensely important for energy-intensive industry, they would not 
necessarily apply to all mechanisms or sectors.  
Environmental integrity. Ultimately all mechanisms need to guarantee 
that they deliver ‘real’ emissions reductions. One of the ongoing 
controversies relates to the current CDM as being largely offsetting. A good 
starting point would be a mechanism or design option that rewards 
ambitious and dynamic baseline levels, including some measure of 
international average or best practice in environment. Such options are 
offered by the reformed CDM and sectoral crediting. JI and sectoral trading 
are less problematic because in theory they incorporate direct and explicit 6 | EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
links to AAUs. However, this depends on the level of initial allocation of 
these units in light of environmental integrity. 
Enhanced Public and Private Investment. Leveraging private investment 
depends on i) improving the investment conditions, in particular, 
improving the predictability of the processes and their time scales of 
operation and ii) making clear that there will be a rate of return for private 
sector capital. Sectoral crediting and sectoral trading depend on the host 
country’s ability to implement intermediary, national systems. In general 
cap-and-trade types of emissions trading (e.g. sectoral trading) could 
leverage a greater scale of financial flows or private investments than other 
baseline-and-credit type options (reformed CDM, reformed JI, sectoral 
crediting). 
Institutional strength. An effective mechanism must work well on its 
own, work together with other mechanisms and fit in with any future 
architecture devised. Timing is also a critical element in the evolution of 
existing mechanisms and the introduction of new ones, especially the end-
dates for access to the mechanisms. There could be several paths built upon 
existing and new mechanisms. One possible path for consideration would 
be the transformation of sectoral crediting into sectoral trading through 
tightening the baselines, ultimately into economy-wide cap-and-trade. 
Another option would be to explore the possibility of converting the CDM 
into JI, inviting new Annex I countries and sectors. Clarification of these 
paths could offer investors more predictability on which to base their 
investment decisions. 
II.  Recommendations 
Existing and new mechanisms 
1.  CDM and JI should enhance efficiency, transparency and governance. 
CDM 
•  Confidence must be maintained in the CDM in order to encourage 
continued and future investment and increased participation from 
both Annex I and developing countries. 
•  Reform of the CDM governance should include a review of the 
procedural efficiency of CDM-related regulatory bodies, including 
the Executive Board, assurances for clear definition of roles and 
responsibilities of all bodies, the Board’s transition to a permanent 
full-time body and the establishment of an appeal procedure for third 
parties.  FLEXIBLE MECHANISMS IN SUPPORT OF A NEW CLIMATE CHANGE REGIME | 7 
 
•  The governance reform should also attempt to simplify or improve 
the additionality assessment to reduce subjectivity and 
unpredictability. 
•  Parties should provide the CDM with a governance structure, 
management systems and guiding principles including due process, 
efficiency, predictability, consistency and transparency. 
•  Parties should streamline the registration and issuance process and 
simplify the procedures in order to increase efficiency. 
•  Parties should facilitate improvement in access to under-represented 
countries, sectors and technology types. 
JI  
•  Host countries could introduce their own simplified procedures. 
•  Host countries should clarify Track I procedures that are currently 
either vague or unavailable. 
•  As reductions from JI projects are backed by the AAUs, the Track II 
requirements for additionality and baseline setting could in principle 
be simplified.   
•  Determination of Track II additionality and baseline criteria could be 
under the competence of the host country. 
The environmental integrity of JI can be safeguarded in doing such 
simplifications, provided that the target setting for the country has been 
stringent in the first place. 
2.  Offset crediting in the CDM should be limited. 
•  Ultimately, the environmental integrity of a flexible mechanism is a 
function of the stringency of a country’s commitment or an 
installation’s cap, in addition to the nature of the mechanism itself. 
Therefore, any incentive embedded in the mechanism that would 
weaken the commitment or cap should be reduced or eliminated. In 
the CDM reform, offset crediting could, in time, be limited to credits 
from less advanced developing countries. 
3.  Sectoral benchmarking in the CDM and sector targets for JI should be 
considered as future options. 
•  Overlap between sectoral benchmarking in the CDM and sectoral 
crediting based on no-lose credits should be avoided. Clear 8 | EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
definitions must be formulated for the two options in order to give 
unambiguous signals to investors. 
•  Countries hosting JI projects should be able to take on binding sector 
targets, thereby further stimulating the reduction of emissions from 
their key sectors and complementing the national cap. 
4.  In the future, JI should continue to allow host countries to choose 
whether to follow Track I or Track II and should integrate new 
Annex I countries and new sectors. 
•  In the future, JI should continue to give host countries the choice to 
rely on the JISC for the approval of projects (Track II) and 
accreditation of Independent Entities or to approve projects and 
implement national determination, verification and accreditation 
measures (Track I), provided the JI host country meets the full set of 
eligibility criteria under the Marrakesh Accords.  
•  JI should be made more attractive to countries or sectors that are 
potentially interested in joining the Annex I grouping and all efforts 
should be made to integrate these countries. An attractive JI could be 
used as a bargaining tool for countries to join Annex I. 
5.  The CDM could be transferred to JI. 
•  JI should be expanded so as to encompass the transformation of CDM 
project activities to a capped environment (backed by AAUs). 
•  Parties should consider how to link the verified future emissions 
reductions with AAUs once the CDM project activities are transferred 
to JI. 
•  Parties should explore how to manage the transition of CDM projects 
that will have been registered and already entered into their crediting 
period when the sector is capped.  
 
An institutional framework and transition 
6.  An institutional framework for existing and new mechanisms should 
provide clarity about investors’ access to market mechanisms and 
improve predictability about investment conditions. 
•  Confidence must be established in the market-based approach, in 
particular through demonstrating that there is long-term FLEXIBLE MECHANISMS IN SUPPORT OF A NEW CLIMATE CHANGE REGIME | 9 
 
predictability associated with the flexible mechanisms and the carbon 
market. 
•  There should be an orderly transition between different types of 
flexible mechanisms. Governments should consult with market 
participants in designing how existing and new mechanisms can run 
alongside or in succession. 
•  Reform of existing mechanisms should be practical with a view to 
making rules and procedures work better.  
•  Reformed mechanisms should be ready as soon as possible to allow a 
predictable transition through to the implementation of new 
mechanisms.  
•  While reformed mechanisms are up and running, support for 
capacity-building aimed at new mechanisms must be provided as it 
takes a long time for new mechanisms to become operational (e.g. 
setting benchmarks, agreeing on where to set the benchmarks and on 
how much flexibility is to be allowed in the benchmarks) and for 
institutions to be established.  
•  New mechanisms should be simple, functional and cost-effective for 
a participating company (e.g. the company’s cost of participation 
should not outweigh expected benefits) and offer potential benefits to 
investors. 
7.  A long-term domestic regulatory framework ideally backed by an 
international agreement should be able to provide some clarity about 
stakeholders’ access to market mechanisms and improve 
predictability about their investment conditions.  
•  Parties should provide rules on treatment of double counting 
especially during a transition period while more than one mechanism 
will likely operate simultaneously. 
•  Parties should make explicit the circumstances and timeframe under 
which a particular mechanism can be used. 
•  Parties should consider applying sunset clauses for changes to the 
different mechanisms.  
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8.  Parties should consider at least two paths for evolving flexible 
mechanisms, sectoral approaches and the transfer of the CDM to JI.  
•  In cooperation with stakeholders, Parties should accelerate and 
advance their discussions on sectoral crediting and sectoral trading 
with a view to reaching an understanding about the objectives and 
structure of each mechanism in Copenhagen. They should then move 
on to the next stages of designing and operationalising each 
mechanism. 
•  Parties should explore paths for the evolution of CDM projects into 
the JI process for countries that have moved into Annex I in a new 
agreement after Copenhagen, in parallel with possible sectoral 
approaches. | 11 
 
 
INTRODUCTION  
he Kyoto Protocol has established three market-based mechanisms, 
all of which contribute to the development of carbon markets: 
international emissions trading (Assigned Amount Unit (AAU) 
trading), the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and Joint 
Implementation (JI). These mechanisms, which are also called ‘flexible 
mechanisms’, are intended to supplement efforts by the Parties to the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) to 
reduce their own greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions in order to help them 
meet their respective commitments. Flexible mechanisms were designed, 
among other reasons, to help the so-called ‘Annex I Parties’ 1  meet 
emissions limitation or reduction commitments in the most cost-effective 
manner.  
While a majority of Parties acknowledge the merits of these multiple 
mechanisms, their future remains open to discussion. In UN negotiations, 
Parties have explored the possibility of introducing new flexible 
mechanisms in support of a future international climate change regime. 
These include sectoral crediting, sectoral trading, Nationally Appropriate 
Mitigation Actions (NAMAs) by developing countries and Reduction of 
Emissions from Deforestation and forest Degradation (REDD). Meanwhile, 
there has been continuous discussion on the CDM or JI reform and their 
several variations. This report compares the relative merits of a selection of 
these proposed mechanisms on the basis of their compliance with a set of 
selected objectives. Its findings and recommendations are directed at 
international negotiators as well as EU stakeholders including business 
                                                      
1  Annex I Parties to the UNFCCC consist of developed countries and countries 
designated as Economies-in-Transition.  
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with a view to contributing to the discussion on existing and new flexible 
mechanisms.  
The basic assumption is that flexible mechanisms will likely play a 
crucial role not only in facilitating a positive outcome in the UN climate 
negotiations, but will also inspire a wide range of actions on their own. 
Moreover, they are expected to focus attention on the necessary business 
investment required to support any future agreement. Like the current 
climate change regime, subsequent periods will witness the co-existence of 
multiple mechanisms that can run concurrently or in combination as the 
Kyoto Protocol’s three flexible mechanisms and domestic market-based 
mechanisms including the EU-ETS already do today. While learning from 
experience in existing mechanisms and improving them will be one step, 
creation of new mechanisms will be another. Like the existing ones, the 
new flexible mechanisms would aim to contribute to advancing climate 
objectives, i.e. achieving real global emission reductions and possibly other 
specific objectives such as sustainable development, technology transfer 
and financing.   
It is likely that different types of mechanisms will enable each 
country to meet specific needs and accommodate national circumstances 
(e.g. data availability and levels of economic development). Different 
mechanisms therefore could target different needs and circumstances. Each 
mechanism would have its own goal, constituency, beneficiary and time-
frame. Such co-existence of multiple mechanisms suits a growing diversity 
in groups of participating countries as ‘one size does not fit all’. However, 
there is concern that the development of too many mechanisms may 
actually ‘confuse’ or reduce private sector investment though over-
broadening the focus. A similar logic could apply to sectors. Probably no 
single mechanism is able to capture all the mitigation opportunities across 
key emitting sectors. Different sectors need different mechanism options. 
Flexible mechanisms could provide Parties with incentives to join in a 
future agreement and provide finance much needed for combating climate 
change. Yet, there is a need for incentives not only to join in but also to 
move on towards the climate objectives. There can be several paths built 
upon existing and new mechanisms, be they fast tracks or not, for moving 
forward. There are also ways to differentiate a Party’s access (e.g. 
preferential treatment, eligibility criteria) to a mechanism.  
This report is structured as follows. Chapter 1 outlines the various 
motives attributed to the different stakeholders behind the flexible 
mechanisms. Chapter 2 draws lessons learnt from existing mechanisms FLEXIBLE MECHANISMS IN SUPPORT OF A NEW CLIMATE CHANGE REGIME | 13 
 
under the Kyoto Protocol such as the CDM, JI and AAU trading. Chapter 3 
explores four future mechanisms: reformed CDM, reformed JI, sectoral 
crediting and sectoral trading. Chapter 4 assesses and compares these 
mechanisms against three sets of objectives: environmental integrity, 
enhanced investment and institutional strength at the international level 
(e.g. integrity of mechanisms with the overall architecture, compatibility 
between mechanisms and coherence of the framework). Chapter 5 closes 
the discussion with concluding remarks. 
This report is written in non-technical language to address a wide 
range of stakeholders. It focuses on key issues such as ‘motivations’, 
‘mechanism options’, ‘lessons’ and ‘objectives’, while fully recognising the 
importance of other issues not covered here. 14 | 
 
 
1.  MOTIVATIONS BEHIND THE FLEXIBLE 
MECHANISMS 
lthough recognising that there are additional driving forces behind 
the proposed mechanisms, this report suggests that the options 
under consideration have been principally shaped by four major 
motivations: achievement of GHG emissions reduction commitments; the 
development of a carbon market, accelerating technology diffusion and 
scaling-up of financing. This wide array of different motivations implies 
that it may not be sufficient to simply reform the existing mechanisms; in 
addition we need to consider how new mechanisms could satisfy at least 
part of these motives and supplement the existing ones.  
Driven by these motives, flexible mechanisms will likely play a 
number of important roles in a future international framework: 
•  To enable developed countries to achieve their emissions reduction 
commitments at lower costs, 
•  To induce carbon markets to decrease compliance costs, 
•  To provide carbon finance for low-carbon investment in developing 
countries, 
•  To ensure developing countries’ own mitigation contributions and 
•  To facilitate technology transfer to developing countries.  
The following sections describe the motives behind flexible 
mechanisms and the expected roles that they could play.  
1.1  Setting GHG emissions reduction commitments 
Future flexible mechanisms are expected to contribute to real emissions 
reductions on a global scale by supplementing a developed country’s or an 
installation’s own emissions reductions for compliance with its 
A FLEXIBLE MECHANISMS IN SUPPORT OF A NEW CLIMATE CHANGE REGIME | 15 
 
commitment. This means that developed countries’ commitments go hand 
in hand with flexible mechanisms and therefore they should be negotiated 
in a package.  
While there is a call, particularly from the EU and some stakeholders, 
to move from pure offsetting to crediting in order to scale up global 
emissions reductions, ultimately achieving the climate objective will 
depend on the level of international commitments undertaken as well as on 
the nature or designs of any flexible mechanism finally devised.   
According to the European Commission (2009a and b), global GHG 
emissions need to peak globally by 2020 and decrease by up to 50% from 
1990 levels by 2050 in order to achieve a 50% chance of limiting the global 
average temperature rise to 2C° (450 ppm). If the probability is to be raised 
above 50%, global emissions need to be reduced by more than 50% from 
1990 levels by 2050. Stabilising emissions at 450 ppm would require Annex 
I countries as a group to reduce GHG emissions by 25% to 40% by 2020, 
and 80% to 95% by 2050, even if emissions in developing countries deviate 
substantially from baseline projections in key regions, according to the 
IPCC Fourth Assessment Report (Gupta et al. 2007: 776; see also European 
Commission 2009b). More recently it is reported that for the first time in 
history the share of global CO2 emissions from developing countries 
(50.3%) has slightly exceeded that of industrialised countries (46.6%) 
(Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency (PBL), 2009). In other 
words, without their contribution, any early stabilisation would be 
impossible to achieve.  
Parties to the Kyoto Protocol are negotiating further commitments of 
GHG emissions reductions by Annex I countries for the next commitment 
period starting in 2013. Parties to the UNFCCC aim at reaching a 
comprehensive global agreement in parallel with the Kyoto Protocol. The 
availability of new flexible mechanisms will most likely encourage 
countries to take on more stringent levels of commitments than they could 
commit to by their own efforts alone, thereby facilitating the conclusion of a 
global agreement.  
1.2  Developing a carbon market 
Flexible mechanisms must appeal to market operators and provide 
incentives for participation. To encourage the private sector to take part in 
the market mechanisms, procedures must be clear, predictable and not 
subject to rapid change.  16 | MOTIVATIONS BEHIND FLEXIBLE MECHANISMS 
C a r b o n  m a r k e t s  s h o u l d  f u n c t i o n  w e l l .  I f  t h e y  d o  n o t ,  p a r t  o f  t h e  
failure could eventually be attributed to inappropriate boundary 
conditions, e.g. lack of ambitious international targets or fragmented 
markets. The uneven and uncoordinated carbon constraints currently 
imposed on major industry sectors across countries have raised concerns 
over international competitiveness and carbon leakage. The development 
of a global carbon market that functions well and is supported by a global 
comprehensive agreement would solve a number of problems arising from 
boundary conditions, as described above.  
The global carbon market has grown steadily since 2004, largely 
driven by the EU-ETS. In 2008 the carbon market (e.g. the EU-ETS, CDM, JI 
and others) was valued at an estimated €92 billion ($125 billion) in 2008, 
which was more than double the 2007 figure of €40 billion (Point Carbon, 
2009). Another estimate placed its value at €86 billion ($126 billion) at the 
end of 2008, also doubling the 2007 value (Capoor & Ambrosi, 2009). 
In circumstances where the product is ‘artificial’ (as in the case of a 
‘reduction’ in greenhouse gas emissions), flexible mechanisms should be 
carefully analysed to ensure appropriate supply and demand. The impact 
of a flexible mechanism on GHG emission reductions depends on the 
balance between the supply of and demand for credits and the 
resulting price level in the carbon market. In carbon markets, demand is 
determined by the level of ambition for emissions reductions in 
internationally negotiated commitments or domestic caps. Supply is set by 
the volume of credits or allowances created by flexible mechanisms. 
Demand for credits from the Kyoto flexible mechanisms over the 
2008-12 period is estimated at 1,635 MtCO2e, of which the private sector 
accounts for 65% – mostly through the CDM and JI (Table 1). 
Capoor & Ambrosi (2009) note that their estimate of CERs (certified 
emissions reductions) supply is much lower (in the range of 1.1-1.3 billion) 
than other analysts’ expectations (ranging from 1.33 to 1.72 billion CERs). 
At the higher end, Trotignon & Leguet (2009) estimate a generation of 1.6 
billion CERs before the end of April 2013. At the lower end, UN RISØ 
Centre predicts that the amount of CERs to be available by the end of 2012 
will total 1,168 million.2 It is possible that the expected amount of supply 
will not materialise. There are a number of factors leading to a downward 
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revision, for example, a lower entry of new projects into pipelines, a lower 
monthly issuance or bottlenecks along the project cycle. It is important to 
take lead-time into account as projects in the pipeline take time to 
implement and they do not always deliver the quantity of credits that were 
predicted. 
Table 1. Supply and demand in perspective, Kyoto Market Balance (2008-12) 
Potential demand from 
industrialised countries 
(MtCO2e) 
Potential supplies (MtCO2e) 
Country or 
entity 
KMs 
demand 
 Likely  Max 
EU 1,200  Potential  GIS  990 1,910 
Govt EU-15  450  Russian Fed.  ?  ? 
Priv sec EU ETS  750 Ukraine  500 1,000 
Possible addt’l 
demand   
125 EU-8+2  490 910 
Japan 400      
Govt Japan  100       
Priv sec Japan  300    
Possible addt’l 
demand 
125    
Rest of Annex 
B 
35 CDM+JI  1,671  1,430-1,974 
Government 20  CDM 1,489  1,330-1,724 
Private sector  15  JI  172  100-250 
Total 1,635      
Government 570       
Private sector  1,065       
Possible addt’l 
demand 
250    
Source: Capoor & Ambrosi (2009). 
As a new climate change regime envisages deeper and wider 
commitments for emissions reductions in Annex I countries, a balanced 
supply and demand in carbon markets requires future large-scale supply of 
credits from existing or new flexible mechanisms, especially those targeting 18 | MOTIVATIONS BEHIND FLEXIBLE MECHANISMS 
large-scale projects or technologies. In other words, an increase in the 
supply needs to be balanced by an increase in demand; otherwise, the 
carbon price and incentives to reduce emissions  would be eroded. A 
balanced supply and demand in the carbon market together with Annex I 
countries’ deeper commitments will send a robust and strong carbon price 
signal to investors. Conversely, a major imbalance in supply will lead to a 
price collapse.  
The Kyoto Protocol and its reduction commitments were agreed in 
1997, several years before the development of the structure and subsequent 
operation of the carbon market., It is now clearly recognised that transition 
economies will  accrue a significant surplus of AAUs resulting from the 
base year specified in the Kyoto Protocol. The magnitude of the resulting 
surplus of AAUs, compared to actual emissions levels, has been 
estimated at up to 10 billion tonnes. Should some or all of this surplus be 
introduced into the carbon market, it could have a major impact on this 
market, including the reformed and new UN market mechanisms, which 
are the subject of this report. This topic was not discussed in detail in the 
Task Force but the potential negative effect of surplus AAUs on the carbon 
market has been identified in discussions within the European Union.  
For credits supply up to 2020, the UNFCCC (2008) quotes the ECN 
study concluding that the total mitigation potential in developing countries 
is likely to exceed 7 GtCO2eq per year in 2020, including REDD and CCS 
(Bakker et al., 2007). At the higher end the Carbon Trust (2009) concludes 
that over the 2013-20 period the total supply would range from 15,000 to 
20,000 MtCO2eq, which is more than 20% of total projected emissions from 
the EU and Japan over the period. However, this estimate could be lowered 
due to the above-mentioned risks concerning shortages in credits or delays 
in registration and credit issuance.  
On the demand side, at the time of writing, not all Annex I countries 
have set firm binding commitments for GHG emissions reductions up to 
2020. Information is limited concerning where and how much potential 
demand will be found over the 2013-20 period. The UNFCCC (2008) quotes 
various estimates ranging from 500 to 1,700 MtCO2eq in 2020.  
The EU-driven demand up to 2020 (see Table 2) is estimated in the 
range of 3,300 to 4,740MtCO2eq depending on the scenarios. 
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Table 2. Total EU credit demand up to 2020 
 20%  scenario 
(MtCO2eq) 
30% scenario 
(MtCO2eq) 
Only indicative 
EU ETS 2008-20  1,700-1,900  2,570 
EU government 2008-12 
(CERs, ERUS or AAUs) 
870 870 
EU government 2013-20  750 1,300 
Total  ~3,300 – 3,500  4,740 
Source: Point Carbon as shown by S. Schjolset in a presentation to the Task Force, 
14 January 2009 (see http://www.ceps.eu/taskforce/cdm-and-post-2012-
flexible-mechanisms). 
Baron et al. (2009) assume that only half of the amount of credits 
worth about 2.8 to 3.1 GtCO2eq that the EU allows access to over the 2008-
20 period would be available over the 2013-20 period under the 20% 
reduction scenario, and estimates that the annual average demand of the 
EU would be about 185 MtCO2eq. The US could become potentially one of 
the largest buyers in the carbon market, but its projected demand level is 
less clear. New Carbon Finance estimates that the US would import credits 
worth about 800 MtCO2eq annually over the 2012-20 period. Consequently 
the sum of the EU and US annual demand would amount to about 1GtCO2 
eq (as estimated by New Carbon Finance in Baron et al., 2009). 
1.3  Accelerating technology diffusion 
The IEA argues that improved efficiency and decarbonising electricity 
could bring CO2 emissions back to current (2005) levels by 2050. The 
portfolio of technologies intended to reduce emissions from 62GtCO2 in the 
reference scenario to 14GtCO2 in the alternative policy scenario include end 
use efficiency, renewables, CCS power generation and nuclear.3 
These forecasts show the challenges to reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions and facilitate a shift to a low-carbon economy with the aid of 
clean technology. Ambitious GHG reduction commitments in both the long 
                                                      
3  P. Boot, presentation at CEPS Task Force meeting, 19 February 2009 (see 
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and short term are required as soon as possible in order to provide the 
predictability needed for investment decisions in clean (low-carbon) 
technologies. There is a sense of urgency to roll out low-carbon 
technologies and to minimise the ‘lock-in’ of today’s technologies, 
requiring investments to start as soon as possible; in other words, large 
infrastructure and capital-intensive investments need to be made right now 
in advanced developing countries. This sense of urgency stems from a 
recognition of mid- to long-term global emissions trajectories and the 
necessary lead-time for investments in large infrastructural development, 
especially those to take place in the energy sector in advanced developing 
countries in the coming decades. The risk of a gap between pre-2012 and 
post-2012 periods has created high uncertainty causing delays in 
investment decisions. 
A robust and strong carbon price signal sent by flexible mechanisms 
to investors would set up the right incentives for investment in low-carbon 
technologies. 4  Flexible mechanisms could have a role in triggering an 
adequate future supply of credits linked to specific technology types. See, 
for example, the proposals being put forth for carbon capture and storage 
(CCS) technologies listed in Box 1. 
These proposals show the potential for flexible mechanisms to 
support deployment of specific technology types. 
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1.4  Scaling up finance 
The European Commission estimates that by 2020 developing countries are 
likely to face annual costs of around €100 billion for mitigation and 
adaptation and that between €22-50 billion will be needed annually for 
international public finance to pay the costs by 2020: the EU will contribute 
€2-15 billion annually, and the international carbon market will provide up 
to €38 billion annually (European Commission, 2009c and d).5  
Since the negotiations of the Kyoto Protocol, the magnitude of the 
challenges confronting countries – such as long-term emissions reductions 
                                                      
5 There is a wide variance in estimates about the scale of finance needed in the mid-
term, depending on assumptions (see e.g. Carbon Trust, 2009). 
Box 1. Some proposals for carbon capture and storage (CCS) 
CCS in emerging countries. China and Brazil are actively developing pilot 
projects. India, Russia and South Africa could be also key partners.  
CCS in the CDM. There have been ongoing discussions in the 
UNFCCC on eligibility of CCS activities under the CDM, facing resistance 
by a small number of countries. This question also leads to Annex I Parties’ 
ability to use CERs from them for their compliance with commitments. The 
IEA put forward a set of suggestions including the approval of a pilot phase 
of CCS in the CDM, development of a targeted mechanism to finance CCS 
technology (and knowledge) transfer post-2012, and development of bank 
financing for portions of projects. These moves could help to create an 
enabling environment even though a carbon price is viewed as a 
prerequisite for CCS. 
CCS in the EU-ETS. Up to 300 million EUAs will be available from 
new entrants’ reserves until the end of 2015 to co-finance construction of 12 
CCS demonstration plants (Article 10a. 8, the EU-ETS Directive). 
CCS in the Green Investment Scheme (GIS). There is a suggestion to use 
the GIS to finance CCS demonstration projects in Central and Eastern 
European countries. 
CCS certification/CO2 storage certificate. This scheme delivers a 
(tradable) certificate for one tonne of CO2 stored underground and supports 
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and technology diffusion – has increased the need to establish an 
appropriately robust financial architecture. The financial architecture 
would define the respective roles for both the public and private sector and 
integrate them. The architecture would also provide different types or 
sources of financing for different areas in need: for example, carbon market 
finance for diffusion or deployment of technology to be complemented by 
targeted public investment in research and development.  
Flexible mechanisms have a potential to leverage private investments. 
CERs and ERUs, which were valued at $4.5-8.5 billion per year in 2007-08, 
are estimated to leverage ten times the overall private investment of $45-85 
billion per year (UNFCCC 2008). The leverage of the CDM alone will be 
discussed in section 2.1.1 below. 
Moreover, flexible mechanisms can be regarded not only as a vehicle 
for international cooperation in facilitating a deal but also as a catalyst to 
re-direct financial and investment flows to a range of mitigation 
opportunities across sectors and activities. There remain a number of 
untapped mitigation opportunities. Some opportunities are considered to 
incur excessive incremental costs (e.g. CCS) while others appear to remain 
under the economy of scale (e.g. improvements in energy efficiency or 
transport). In addition there is a lack of incentives for energy efficiency on 
both the demand and supply sides. New mechanisms can take advantage 
of opportunities that are left outside the coverage of existing mechanisms, 
for example a cap-and-trade scheme such as the EU-ETS.  
For developing countries, it is important that existing and new 
mechanisms allow growth and development to continue in a robust and 
environmentally-sound manner through incremental investment from 
Annex I countries and businesses. They should also lead to credits that are 
redeemable in the external market. | 23 
 
2.  LESSONS FROM EXISTING 
MECHANISMS 
o date most of the experiences in flexible mechanisms come from the 
clean development mechanism (CDM). In 2008 transactions by the 
(primary) CDM recorded 389 MtCO2e in volume compared with JI at 
20MtCO2e and $6,519 million in value compared with JI at $294 million 
(Capoor & Ambrosi, 2009). The CDM has dominated transactions under the 
flexible mechanisms in both volume and value, benefiting from its earlier 
start than other mechanisms. Although there have not been many projects 
from JI, they have produced some lessons. The year 2008 also marked the 
start of a few large trades of AAUs, some of which involve conditions for 
‘greening’ in a Green Investment Scheme (GIS). Box 2 summarises the 
characteristics of the CDM and JI.  
 
 
T 
Box 2. Characteristics of the CDM and JI 
•  Cost-effectiveness. They provide for cost-effective emissions reductions 
in host countries, and reduce the overall cost of complying with 
Annex I countries’ emissions reduction requirements. However, there 
are issues on administrative costs and unpredictability about the 
timelines for registration, issuance and approval. 
•  Technology transfer. They promote transfer of technologies to reduce 
emissions in host countries.  
•  Co-benefits. These projects often have considerable side benefits in the 
form of reduced emissions of other pollutants as well as social, health 
and economic benefits. 
•  Financing. These projects provide private financing to emissions 
reduction projects in non-trading sectors. The most significant feature 
is that the financing, predominantly private, is mostly provided 
directly to the projects, and not through an intermediary at host 
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Experiences in both the CDM and JI resulted in some achievements as 
well as difficulties with specific issues. Some are considered to require 
continuous discussion (e.g. ensuring additionality and governance), 
whereas others have led to immediate actions for improvements, e.g. 
scaling up the CDM through the Nairobi framework and Programmes of 
Activities (PoAs) or extended use of benchmarks, e.g. submission of a 
sectoral benchmarking methodology for the cement sector. 
2.1  CDM 
The CDM was established under the Kyoto Protocol as a means of 
stimulating sustainable development and allowing Annex I countries to 
meet their national targets by acquiring lower-cost carbon emissions 
reductions from projects in non-Annex I countries.  
2.1.1  Achievements 
The CDM should be evaluated against what it was meant for, namely, to 
support sustainable development and to generate credits for Annex I 
countries. The CDM is the most frequently used among the flexible 
mechanisms and the only one to engage both developing countries and the 
private sector. The CDM opened up a way for developing countries to 
enter a carbon market, requiring only minimal domestic capacity and 
institutional set-up.  
The CDM is generally seen as a success, especially by developing 
countries. According to data published by the UNEP RISØ CENTRE, as of 
1 November 2009, the CDM had more than 4,700 projects in the pipeline. 6 It 
is estimated that up to 1.3 billion CERs could be issued before the end of 
2012 and 5.8 billion CERs during the period 2013-20 (Capoor & Ambrosi, 
2009).  
There are a number of factors explaining the success of the CDM. 
First, through the process, participants learned about methodologies and 
accounting for greenhouse gases. Second, the CDM has attracted the active 
participation of the private sector. Table 1 showed the engagement of the 
private capital in Annex I/B countries. The CDM has triggered large-scale 
private investments. It is estimated that the CDM has benefited about €75 
billion ($106 billion) of overall 2002-08 investment in projects that reduce 
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GHG emissions for an average leverage ratio of 4.6 whereas if industrial 
gas projects were excluded, the ratio would have reached 6.5 (Capoor & 
Ambrosi (2009).7 Moreover, the CDM market grew as a result of a decision 
to allow unilateral projects: this option enables local entities in developing 
countries to implement projects according to their own priorities, and look 
for the best buyer. Third, an appreciation of the real costs and opportunities 
of carbon contributes to an increased awareness among participants and 
the public, also in countries where the government has not had any GHG 
regulation in place. This also means that it is easier for governments and 
companies in developing countries to see mitigation as a business 
opportunity. Lastly, a 2% levy on the proceeds from the CDM to finance the 
Adaptation Fund was one of the early attempts to set up a fund sourced 
from a portion of emissions allowances. 
2.1.2  Areas for discussion 
Despite significant achievements, there have been calls for change (see e.g. 
Olsen & Fenhann, 2008) in the way the CDM operates concerning the 
uneven distribution of projects, under-representation of sectors or project 
types, additionality, administrative and organisational issues, windfall 
profits in certain low-cost projects, interpretation of sustainable 
development, pure-offsetting and technology transfer. These specific 
concerns are discussed below. 
Uneven distribution of projects 
One of the most discussed areas is the concentration on or inequitable 
distribution of projects among project types, sectors and countries. For 
example, four countries account for more than 80% of all CDM projects. 
China alone accounts for 59% of expected average annual CERs from 
registered projects by host party, followed by India (11.27%), Brazil (6.45%) 
and the Republic of Korea (4.59%).8 
                                                      
7 For the methodology for computing investment and leverage factors, see Capoor 
& Ambrosi (2007). 
8 See http://cdm.unfccc.int/Statistics/Registration/ 
AmountOfReductRegisteredProjPieChart.html 
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This concentration is not limited to the CDM but occurs in any 
market mechanism. There are a number of possible reasons to explain the 
phenomenon. The most clear-cut projects were the ones where 
methodologies were developed first. Once a methodology is approved it 
can be used by anyone.  
What is commonly termed as ‘concentration’ or ‘inequitable 
distribution of projects’ could also result from relative attractiveness of host 
countries, which may not be necessarily limited to CDM projects. To some 
extent project distribution is a natural consequence of a market mechanism. 
Markets do not choose host countries and cannot be held accountable for 
the result. Participation in the CDM is voluntary, therefore there is a limit 
to what can be done to promote wider distribution beyond changes to 
design elements. Then, the next step would be to consider how to soften the 
natural consequences of a market mechanism by improving access to the 
CDM by under-represented countries.  
Sectors not suitable for project-based crediting 
In some cases the CDM may have done so well in financing emissions 
reductions in developing countries that some say it has exhausted low-cost 
opportunities under existing approved methodologies. It has been 
suggested that the more advance developing countries have been quickly 
materialised and monetised their low-cost mitigation potentials (‘low-
hanging fruits’) through CDM projects, e.g. HFC and N2O projects. In other 
cases of low-cost opportunities such as demand-side energy efficiency, the 
potential has not been fully harvested. There has been a claim that it is 
difficult to capture mitigation potential in some sectors with dispersed 
emissions sources. This poses particular methodological challenges, and 
monitoring requirements incur high transaction costs, but yield a relatively 
low volume of CERs.  
Energy efficiency and transport do not account for a large share of 
CERs. Demand-side energy efficiency and transport have particular 
difficulties in the CDM since their potentials are not easily made into 
‘projects’. Supply-side energy efficiency takes 11%, while demand-side 
energy efficiency accounts for only 1%.9  
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Differentiation 
Today, a CDM project can be undertaken in any non-Annex I country that 
is a party to the KP and fulfils the eligibility requirements. In future all 
parties, project types or technology types10  may not need to be treated 
exactly the same. Nonetheless, all emissions reductions are important in the 
sense of reducing GHGs in the atmosphere irrespective of where they take 
place. In order to politically encourage reductions in certain applications or 
manage the ‘emissions-reduction supply-demand’ balance, discounting of 
certain projects has been proposed as a tool. It is important to stress that 
this could lead to economically less efficient economic solutions. Therefore 
it could be applied as a temporary instrument and subject to review to 
assess the intended effect (e.g. the Nairobi Framework, see below). 
There could be at least three approaches to differentiation: 
preferential treatment, eligibility criteria and a discount or a premium rate 
(Bakker et al., 2009; Schneider, 2008). First, it is possible to allow 
preferential treatment in procedures, access to resources (e.g. specific funds 
for project financing) and methodology (e.g. use of ambitious benchmarks, 
removal of an additionality test, a simplified additionality test, allowing 
use of conservative default values, sampling in monitoring, etc.). Second, 
there are different types of eligibility, e.g. for potential sellers to host 
projects or for potential buyers to use CERs for compliance. More 
specifically, this often means drafting a positive or negative list of project 
types. Third and lastly, there are quantitative methods including a 
discounting rate and a premium rate: the former refers to a formula in 
which one tonne CO2eq equals less than one CER; and the latter to a 
formula in which one tonne CO2eq equals more than one CER. Discounting 
would distort the market and risk undermining incentives for project 
development and investment in developing countries. A premium could 
serve as an economic incentive for project development and investment 
that could deliver, for example, sustainable development benefits.  
                                                      
10 Projects or credits earned from the projects can be treated differently according 
to countries (e.g. mitigation costs relative to GDP, weighting under-represented 
regions), project types (e.g. sustainable development benefits, benefits to the 
atmosphere), technology types (e.g. renewable electricity) or technological or 
financial requirements (see e.g. Bakker et al. 2009). 28 | LESSONS FROM EXISTING MECHANISMS 
Some elements of differentiation are already taking place under the 
current rules. A premium, reflecting willingness to pay, has been observed 
among CER buyers, e.g. the premium by the CDM Gold Standard. Among 
the examples of supply side differentiation are the exclusion of some 
project types, the exclusion of Least Developed Countries (LDCs) from the 
CDM levies and allowing simplified procedures for small-scale projects.  
An example of a more comprehensive approach is found in the 
Nairobi Framework launched in 2006 and aimed at increasing Africa’s 
share in hosting CDM projects.  About 80 countries entered the CDM 
pipeline with some newcomers from sub-Sahara Africa and the Middle-
East joining in 2008 and early 2009 (see Capoor & Ambrosi, 2009). 11 
Moreover, one attempt has been made in the EU’s effort-sharing Decision 
(European Union, 2009b) targeting the 2013-20 period and granting 
favourable treatment for projects in LDCs/Small Island Developing States 
(SIDS). Still, that in itself is not enough to bring about projects in these 
countries. 
Additionality 
Additionality refers to reduction in emissions that would not have occurred 
in the absence of a CDM project. Additionality is a counterfactual concept, 
once a project goes ahead it is no longer possible to know what would have 
happened in the absence of the project. For example, industry gases like 
HFCs/N2O can be easily certified as additional to baseline. However, even 
if a project can clearly demonstrate additionality, there might be objections 
to it being approved as a CDM project: for example, due to the potential 
impact of increased and unnecessary HCFC-22 production on ozone 
depletion. Ambiguity over additionality itself as well as rules that are open 
to interpretation and reinterpretation bring about delays and increase 
transaction costs. The impact of ambiguity over additionality, significantly 
varies from one project type to another: as a share of total projects with a 
request for review due to additionality, wind power and hydro power 
scores stand out, accounting for 89% and 88% respectively.12 Consequently 
there has been an interest in alternative, more conservative and simpler 
ways to address the issue of additionality (e.g. benchmarks, see below). The 
                                                      
11 See http://cdm.unfccc.int/Statistics/index.html 
12 D. Agostini, presentation at the CEPS Task Force meeting, 14 January 2009 (see 
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question then is at what level to balance the environmental integrity with 
ease of the process.  
Administrative and organisational issues 
It has been argued that the CDM has become administratively 
cumbersome. There are concerns about delays in registration and issuance 
partly attributed to the additionality requirement, resulting not only in 
higher transaction costs but also in losses in supply of CER volumes as well 
as the monetary loss of CER revenues, which pose additional risks for 
investors and developers. In September 2009, the UNEP RISØ Centre 
reported that the average issuance delay for projects with CERs issued is 
13.2 months while the average issuance delay for registered projects 
without issuance is 15.7 months. About a quarter of the 1,245 registered 
CDM projects without issuance experienced an issuance delay from 24 to 
48 months.13 
Partly due to the mechanism’s own success and popularity, it is also 
noted that projects recently entering the pipeline, which are increasingly 
hosted in poorer countries, have been subject to a longer wait and a lower 
success rate. This suggests that the current system is overstretched to cope 
with the inflow of projects waiting for decisions by regulatory bodies. 
Another concern is the lack of predictability in the regulatory framework, 
with confusion surrounding the timelines for registration, issuance and 
approval.  
Windfall profits or over-payment in certain low-cost projects  
Profit-making itself is the rationale behind market instruments such as the 
flexible mechanisms. The prospect of potential profits serves as a driver for 
action. Investors primarily seek to maximise returns for minimum risk 
within the given set of rules and time frame and also show interest in cost-
effective opportunities. There has been a concern about the extent to which 
mitigation costs have been compensated by credits generated from certain 
low-cost projects like industrial gas (e.g. HFC, N2O) projects. One might 
even suggest that the difference between the EUA price and the abatement 
cost in developing countries has created economic rents to developers of 
CDM projects. On the other hand the principle of marginal prices and the 
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benefit they give to the lowest-cost producer are well accepted in other 
markets. 
It has been concluded that HFC and N2O projects are clearly 
additional and therefore meet this criterion of the CDM. However, the 
above concern could be softened by addressing at least two questions: 
Should these projects receive only a limited number of CERs? Should CERs 
from such projects be taxed (as it is done in China), and the tax revenue be 
used for sustainable development in order to compensate for the 
shortcomings resulting from the projects. 
Decentralised interpretation of sustainable development 
In the Marrakesh Accords, Parties agreed that countries define their own 
sustainable development criteria in accordance with national priorities. 
Consequently there is a wide spectrum of interpretation as to what 
constitute sustainable development benefits. And even once defined, it is 
difficult to measure and quantify the sustainable development benefits.  
Offsetting 
It has been claimed that the current CDM is almost pure-offsetting (see e.g. 
Höhne & Ellermann, 2008). CERs represent emissions reductions proven to 
have taken place in non-Annex I countries but sold to either an entity in an 
Annex I country for part of its compliance with domestic legislation 
including the EU-ETS Directive, or an Annex I country’s government for 
part of its compliance with the Kyoto Protocol. In other words, the rules 
allow these buyers to overshoot their emissions caps or targets but use 
CERs to compensate for the overshoot, hence the term ‘offsetting’. Given 
the (lack of) progress in Annex I countries’ achievement relative to the 
Kyoto targets, there has been a growing call – particularly from the EU – to 
phase out the current CDM as pure-offsetting.  
Technology transfer 
While studies report some progress in technology transfer (see e.g. Haites 
et al., 2006 and de Coninck et al., 2007), a number of developing countries 
have indicated that the CDM does not lead to technology transfer as 
defined under Article 4.5 of the UNFCCC. However, technology transfer 
was never meant to be the primary objective of the CDM, as agreed in the 
Protocol. In addition the operation period of five years (2008-12) for the 
CDM is too short to achieve the full effect of technology transfer. On the 
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available low-carbon technology mainly in energy supply and industry as 
well as potentially in the waste sector.  
2.1.3  Areas for ongoing improvement 
Most of the above discussion points have been already addressed in the 
UN processes. In response to additionality requirements, efforts have been 
made to create new categories as the basis for crediting, expanding the 
scope of activities beyond individual projects to programmes or sectors.  
Programmes of Activities 
With the aim of expanding the scope of the CDM beyond projects, a new 
framework has been introduced, known as Programmes of Activities 
(PoAs), using the existing CDM infrastructure. It increases the possibility to 
register a set of activities of the same type in a wide area under a single 
‘programmatic’ umbrella. The rationale behind it is to enhance the 
efficiency of the operation process, and increase its applicability as well as 
the volume of credits. It is also expected to facilitate access on the part of 
countries without a track record to the CDM by allowing the re-grouping of 
single projects that would otherwise be too small to be commercially 
attractive or viable. Nine PoAs were at the validation stage in April 2009, 
focusing on efficient lighting, solar heating and waste management, and 
two new PoAs were submitted in August. For example, Mexico has 
prepared a national light-bulb replacement programme. India has recently 
announced a similar programme and submitted a new project on 
promotion of biomass-based heat generation systems. 
Sectoral benchmarking in the CDM  
Sectoral benchmarking in the CDM establishes a dynamic baseline based 
on a pre-determined benchmark (e.g. for emissions per tonne of 
production) for a whole sector (e.g. cement, power and steel have been 
suggested) or sub-sector in a country or a region. Sectoral benchmarking in 
the CDM ensures environmental integrity as well as predictability by 
demonstrating additionality and setting the baseline with stringent and 
differentiated pre-determined benchmarks. An example of ‘top of the class’ 
benchmarking can be found in a recent CDM methodology for 
refrigerators. In another example, the World Business Council for 
Sustainable Development Cement Sustainability Initiative (WBCSD-CSI) 
has been developing a benchmarking CDM methodology for the cement 32 | LESSONS FROM EXISTING MECHANISMS 
sector based on 1) a cement standard CO2 protocol to allow comparison of 
‘like for like’ and 2) the established database, ‘Getting the Number Right 
(GNR)’. The methodology was submitted to the Executive Board in April 
2009. In this methodology the benchmarks are expressed in the emissions 
carbon intensity per cement or clinker tonne in a given region and are used 
to calculate baseline scenario emissions and to demonstrate additionality. 
The environmental integrity is enhanced due to the dynamic nature of the 
baseline, adjusted for BAU (business as usual) improvements. This 
methodology has been tested in existing CDM projects, and further 
developed incorporating feedback from stakeholders before submission to 
the Executive Board.  
Sectoral benchmarking for baseline setting (and to assess 
additionality) can be done regionally or globally depending on parameters. 
It should be noted, however, that many developing countries view 
benchmarking as a form of ‘international standardisation’ against which 
their business sectors could be judged. Sectoral benchmarking in the CDM 
will be likely to start in advanced developing countries because of its 
orientation towards the economic structure in the energy, industry and 
transport sectors. 
2.1.4  Lessons 
The CDM has made a number of important achievements: GHG emissions 
reductions and sustainable development benefits in non-Annex I countries, 
first steps towards MRV and GHG accounting, attracting the participation 
of the private sector, encouraging investment flows to developing 
countries, raising awareness of abatement opportunities among 
participants and the public and generating revenue for adaptation actions. 
Areas for further discussion include the uneven distribution of projects, 
preferential treatment for LDCs, additionality, administrative and 
organisational issues, offsetting and technology transfer. Ongoing 
improvements are being introduced in two areas: Programmes of Activities 
(PoAs), and sectoral benchmarking in the CDM. 
2.2  JI  
The Kyoto Protocol created Joint Implementation (JI) in parallel with the 
CDM to finance projects aimed at reducing GHG emissions in Annex I 
countries. JI is designed for use in Annex I countries with capped GHG 
emissions: all emissions reductions transacted under JI are controlled by a 
legally binding obligation attached to an AAU by each party to the Kyoto FLEXIBLE MECHANISMS IN SUPPORT OF A NEW CLIMATE CHANGE REGIME | 33 
 
Protocol. Hence JI has the potential to be more flexible in its design than the 
CDM, since JI re-distributes emissions reduction units (ERUs) under a cap. 
Despite this fundamental difference between the mechanisms, the 
methodologies and procedures developed for the CDM have been in 
practice adopted for JI as well. It is important to mention that JI is not 
limited in scope as any emissions reduction/sinks enhancement activity 
can be credited if it is ‘additional’. 
JI is actually a two-track mechanism: 
•  The so-called ‘Track I’ is supervised by the UNFCCC only at a macro, 
country level: it is a bilateral agreement between two Annex I 
countries. If those two countries are eligible, they may determine 
emissions reductions generated by JI projects and transfer the 
corresponding amount of Emissions Reduction Units. Countries 
eligible to track I are also eligible to track II.  
•  The so-called ‘Track II’ is supervised by the UNFCCC at a micro 
level, on a project-by-project basis. The Joint Implementation 
Supervisory Committee (JISC) is the U N  b o d y  t h a t  s u p e r v i s e s  t h e  
mechanism. It may give greater certainty to the investor since 
reductions under a Track II project are valid even if the host country 
as a whole does not meet its obligations. 
Track I could provide a more simplified procedure and greater 
flexibility in scope and process. However, it could also result in less 
consistency and less transparency than the Track II because processes can 
potentially differ from one country to another, projects are not governed by 
the JISC or verified by a third party, and the market may not perceive one 
ERU to be equal to another ERU. ERU transactions under Track I are 
similar to AAU transactions.  
2.2.1  Achievements 
As of 1 November 2009, a total of 243 JI projects have entered into the 
pipeline. Some 179 Track II projects and 64 Track I projects are in the 
pipeline. Some projects have moved from Track II to Track I.14  
By project type, renewables account for most of the number of JI 
projects, but CH4 reductions (mainly reduction of losses in natural gas 
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pipelines) account for most of the ERUs. By country, Russia and Ukraine 
host most of the JI projects: Russia hosts 107 JI Track II projects but no 
Track I project; Ukraine hosts 27 projects under Track II and 7 under Track 
I.15 
2.2.2  Areas for discussion 
There are a number of reasons why a limited amount of JI projects have 
been approved for the time being by the JISC or Track I countries: 
•  Limited understanding of the specificities and benefits of JI on the 
part of potential host countries, which include not only Russia, 
Ukraine, Belarus and the EU’s newest member states, but potentially 
all Annex I countries; therefore there has been little activity in setting 
up procedures, rules and methods, providing guidance to project 
developers, and deciding on projects. 
•  Delays in approval of projects by host countries, especially Russia. 
•  The JISC has promoted more stringent additionality procedures than 
market participants expected, spilling over from CDM 
methodologies. This, combined with late and somewhat unclear 
guidance on JISC rules and procedures, has resulted in the need to 
reformulate many early JI projects; 
•  Delays in establishing approval procedures and other bottlenecks e.g. 
small number of Accredited Independent Entities (AIEs) and 
important delays by the independent entities in finalizing 
determinations of Project Design Documents (PDDs); 
•  Limited possibilities in eligible and interested JI host parties (EU 
member states) after the implementation of EU ETS; 
•  Lack of flexibility shown by JISC in respect of the around 150 world-
wide JI so called “early mover projects” (some of them are still 
waiting track I registration); 
•  A short crediting period combined with uncertainty about JI beyond 
2012 also has impeded the broad use of JI. The current JI crediting 
period is shorter than that of the CDM and does not match an 
investment cycle especially for large-scale investments in the energy 
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sector planned in coming decades.  Extension of a JI crediting period 
aligning with the CDM can be considered. 
Some issues like additionality requirement and subsequent 
regulatory delays are similar to CDM issues.  
2.2.3  Areas for ongoing improvement 
Some progress has been made in baseline setting and expansion of the 
scope to programmatic and sectoral JI, which are similar to CDM issues. 
JI baseline and benchmarking 
JI Track II may apply an approved CDM baseline methodology or develop 
its own approach. In the latter case there is a need to provide a clear 
guidance for how to describe the baseline emissions. The JISC has 
developed a Determination and Verification Manual (DVM) including 
guidance for baseline setting, monitoring, additionality etc.  
As reductions from JI projects are backed by the AAUs, the case can 
be made for – in principle - simplifying the requirements for additionality 
and baseline setting. There is a question about who has competence to 
determine additionality and baseline criteria. Baseline criteria could be set 
out in a generic manner based on historical emissions of an existing 
installation or comparison with newly implemented installations not 
applying JI activities. 
Sectoral and Programmatic JI 
Binding sector targets would further stimulate the reduction of emissions 
from key sectors in countries hosting JI projects and complement national 
targets. Reductions below the binding sector targets can be traded, thus 
providing an incentive to reduce emissions below the target. Interestingly, 
sectoral JI is feasible under the existing regulatory framework, but no host 
country has implemented a sectoral JI project so far. 
Similarly, programmatic JI can be a cost-effective mechanism of 
achieving emissions reductions from sectors with diffused emission sources 
that are otherwise difficult to mitigate (e.g. reducing heat losses in district 
heating systems). The JISC is actually preparing guidance on such projects 
under JI Track II procedure. It is reported that the first programmatic JI 
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2.2.4  Lessons 
Simplification of procedures and relative flexibility in scope and process 
contributed to a considerable increase in the number of JI projects under 
the Track I. Some areas for discussion and ongoing improvements are 
similar to those under the CDM: simplification of baseline setting and 
potential expansion of the scope to sectoral and programmatic JI. 
2.3  AAUs trading and the GIS 
The Kyoto Protocol allows international emission trading (IET) (Assigned 
Amount Unit (AAU) trading) between Annex I countries. Because of the 
number of AAUs initially allocated to 10 EU member states in Central and 
Eastern Europe (EU-10)16, Ukraine and the Russian Federation for the first 
commitment period, trade in AAUs with these countries without a specific, 
dedicated underlying emission reduction activity is often considered ‘hot 
air’ trade. 
The design of AAU trading has been left to participating Annex I 
countries. One form of AAU trading is the Green Investment Scheme (GIS), 
which was introduced as an attempt to enhance the environmental 
integrity of the AAU trading. The GIS aims to combine a transfer of AAUs 
with an activity that has a positive effect on GHG emissions reductions and 
is financed with revenues from selling surplus AAUs.  
In 2008 and early 2009, there were several transactions (four in 2008 
and five in early 2009) of about 90 million AAUs, totalling in value some 
€0.91 billion ($1.2 billion)(Capoor & Ambrosi, 2009). Hungary sold 2 
million AAUs for ‘hard greening’17 to Belgium and 6 million in a similar 
transaction to Spain (Point Carbon, 2009). It is reported that Japan 
concluded and published greening guidelines as an annex to AAU 
                                                      
16 12 new member states acceded to the EU in 2004 and 2007 except Malta and 
Cyprus. 
17  The World Bank (2004) proposed two concepts of greening: ‘hard greening’ 
refers to the case in which “an AAU is greened when the activities financed 
through the proceeds of the sale have generated one unit of emission reductions 
measured against a baseline scenario describing what would have happened in the 
absence of the greening activity”; and ‘soft greening’ is defined as “the effective 
implementation of certain pre-defined activities” such as implementation of a 
demand-side management programme, dismantling of energy subsidies, capacity-
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purchase agreements with the Czech Republic, which set a GIS in place. 
These guidelines list types of environmental measures to be financed and 
describe broad eligibility criteria (see Peszko, 2009). 
There are no international legal regulations regarding the GIS and 
thus the way the scheme can be set up is flexible, depending on how the 
buyer and seller countries formulate a transaction. The success of this 
formula crucially depends on the credibility of the host country’s pledge to 
implement actions, ranging from allocation of revenues to the designated 
activity to monitoring and verification of greening. Increased transparency 
in AAU transactions is a key element in the GIS.   
It is likely that the GIS will largely remain government-to-
government transactions where the private sector plays a limited role for a 
number of reasons, including the fact that the EU-ETS Directive does not 
allow the covered installations to use AAUs as part of their compliance. 
Moreover, companies cannot easily engage in transactions with 
governments, or there will be the question of liability for project failure or 
non-delivery of emissions reductions.  
Since the concept has only recently been tested in practice, yielding 
limited experience, it is too early to draw lessons from what has happened. 
However, some potential host countries have difficulty in competing with 
other market mechanisms in parallel. In particular, the EU-10 faced the risk 
of double-counting between schemes in place as well as the limits on 
capacity and resources for setting the GIS infrastructure.   38 | 
 
 
3.  MECHANISM OPTIONS IN THE FUTURE 
hile recognising the importance of other mechanism options, this 
Task Force report focuses on four potential future flexible 
mechanisms (the reformed CDM and JI and sectoral crediting 
and sectoral trading). Like existing mechanisms, all future mechanisms 
would aim to contribute to advancing climate objectives, i.e. real global 
emissions reductions and possibly other specific objectives such as 
sustainable development, technology transfer and financing. They can all 
benefit from the lessons learned from existing mechanisms and be 
developed into instruments supporting the architecture of a new climate 
change regime. Box 3 summarises the potential benefits of the CDM and JI 
beyond 2012.  
 
 
 
In some countries the CDM could be converted to operate in a capped 
environment, equivalent to JI. JI could achieve emissions reductions in 
W 
Box 3. Potential benefits of the CDM and JI beyond 2012 
•  Increase the scope and incentive for today’s non-Annex I Parties to become 
Annex I Parties. In the future, JI could allow for the rolling over of 
CDM projects from an un-capped to a capped environment for 
developing countries that wish to become Annex I parties or agree to 
take on binding (sector) targets.  
•  Provide an incentive for Annex I parties not yet linked to ETS. A 
continuation of JI would also provide a mechanism for continued 
financing of projects in countries like Russia, Ukraine and Belarus as 
well as potentially new Annex I parties – countries where the 
institutional framework for linking to an emissions trading scheme is 
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sectors not covered by a domestic emissions trading scheme, which has 
b e e n  t h e  c a s e  i n  t h e  E U - 1 0 .  W h i l e  s u c h  a  v i s i o n  w o u l d  h e l p  t o  e x p l o r e  
possible directions of future mechanism options, the immediate focus of 
both the CDM and JI beyond 2012 is placed on administrative and 
governance issues. A number of ideas for the CDM or JI beyond 2012 were 
presented in chapter 2. 
In contrast sectoral crediting and sectoral trading remain largely 
conceptual at this stage. Thus, the emphasis here will be placed on 
illustrating what it is, how it will work and what are remaining questions 
for each sectoral option. One should keep in mind that sectoral crediting 
and sectoral trading are unlikely to work side-by-side in a single sector. 
3.1  CDM reform and beyond 
Expansion of the scope to sectoral and programmatic activities would help 
to scale up private investments, develop the carbon market and create more 
opportunities for emissions reductions. It should be noted that a deal 
including ‘sectoral targets’ may lead to new challenges for the CDM. In 
either case the anticipated increase in new CDM projects or issuance of 
CERs would require improvements in the efficiency of administration and 
an increase in the transparency of governance. To manage the anticipated 
increase in projects, it is necessary to improve the flow of the registration 
and issuance process without losing any necessary rigour inherent in the 
procedures that assures the system. Proposals for governance reform 
(IETA, 2008) include the assessment or review of the existing capacity and 
procedural efficiency of CDM-related regulatory bodies including the 
Executive Board, assurance for a clear definition of roles and 
responsibilities of these bodies, reproducibility and predictability in 
decision-making and the establishment of an appeals procedure for third 
parties. Parties have been invited to provide the CDM with a governance 
structure, management systems and guiding principles. In so doing, it is 
important to look at the support structure that underpins the work of the 
Executive Board (EB), such as the role of the Secretariat, the Registration 
and Issuance Teams (RITs) and the Designated Operational Entities 
(DOEs). It is claimed that the majority of registration and issuance 
problems can be traced to the lack of ‘due process’ within the CDM; 
however, what is less clear is where the process actually fails. In some 
cases, problems arise from EB decision-making and time constraints, in 
others, from RIT or Secretariat resource constraints while in others market-40 | MECHANISM OPTIONS IN THE FUTURE 
driven testing (for project approval) or a lack of DOE resources can present 
obstacles. Another source of registration and issuance problems is the 
difficulty in implementing effective additionality criteria. Efficiency, 
predictability, consistency and transparency are important guiding 
principles of good governance, which is essential for a successful CDM. The 
inherent challenge associated with the CDM being a financing mechanism 
requires additional transparency. It is critical, as has been recognised for 
the EU-ETS, that project assessments are kept separately from the 
regulator. 
3.2  JI reform and beyond 
There are issues to be addressed, similar to those in the case of the DCM, in 
order for JI to become an optimally functioning mechanism. These include 
administrative and organisational issues pertaining to the Joint 
Implementation Supervisory Committee (JISC) as well as more technical 
issues such as baseline setting and methodology choices. These steps do not 
require changes in the text of Article 6 of the Kyoto Protocol and could be 
formulated within a COP/CMP resolution, i.e. at COP15 in December 2009. 
There is a need to improve the governance, efficiency and transparency of 
JI in both Track I and Track II. This calls for the removal of bottlenecks, 
strengthening of the JISC and obtaining cooperation from host countries for 
simplification of procedures. 
At the same time, the role and scope of JI after 2012, including new 
important JI actors being transformed from non-Annex I to Annex I 
countries and thereby moved from the CDM context to the JI context, are 
fundamental issues to address. In the future, as more and more countries 
and sectors are expected to commit to GHG limitation and reduction, the 
role of JI may change and increase substantially. 
There are several possibilities to include incentives in JI that could 
help other countries take on binding reduction targets. JI today encourages 
a country to attract capital for investment in climate-friendly technology by 
offering a payback via crediting (ERUs) of the emissions reduction for a 
certain period. After this period, the benefit of the investment will 
contribute to the national targets. During the crediting period, the benefit 
goes to the investor, so the country must rely on other measures to reach its 
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3.3  Sectoral crediting  
Unlike the CDM, a sectoral crediting mechanism credits emissions 
reductions from a covered sector against a threshold possibly below the 
business as usual scenario. Sectoral crediting based on no-lose targets 
intends to encourage emissions reductions (orchestrated by the host 
country) in a key emitting sector in developing countries. It could set a 
price signal for a broader part of the economy, including power and key 
industry sectors. Box 4 shows key elements of the EU proposal for a 
sectoral crediting mechanism. There will be no penalty for failing to reach a 
target or to implement it, hence the term ‘no-lose’. A baseline will be 
negotiated as part of an international agreement (Ward et al., 2008) or be 
domestically set on the basis of sectoral benchmarks (CCAP et al., 2008). 
The baseline could be expressed in absolute emissions levels, the carbon 
intensity (e.g. CO2 emissions per unit of output) or technology penetration 
rates. For baseline setting it is worth mentioning that many of the 
industries to be covered are either owned or operated by governments. 
In practice developing countries first propose to implement policies 
and measures in key sectors that could move the emissions trend well 
below the BAU. Host countries will finance these policies and measures 
themselves while receiving a negotiated package for technology and 
financial support through public finance from developed countries. And on 
top of that, they could expect revenues from the sale of their credits on 
international carbon markets.  
A technical merit of sectoral crediting is its circumvention of the 
additionality test on a project basis. Sectoral crediting assesses the 
performance of a whole sector instead of individual activities, although 
monitoring will still need to be performed at an installation level for 
aggregation into a sector level.  
Credits for emissions reductions below the baseline are issued ex-post 
and can be sold on international carbon markets. One open question is 
whether credits should be issued directly to companies in sectors or 
channelled through the government. There are two important aspects of 
this question. First, how can one ensure that the price signal set at the 
international level would be passed on to firms operating in the country? 
Second, how can one ensure that the private sector will be fully engaged, 
for example through benchmarking exercises or through participation in a 
domestic emissions trading scheme? This uncertainty raises a serious 
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and in a longer term. For potential sellers it would be essential to directly 
receive emissions reduction credits whose value can be internationally 
recognised, and which would enable them to participate in the 
international carbon market and raise revenues there, for example, to 
purchase low-carbon technology or equipment for further reductions.  
A scenario under which companies in an Annex I country have to 
purchase credits in order to operate or produce products whilst companies 
based in a non-Annex I country receive free allocation or are given ‘no-lose’ 
targets (and saleable credits) has the potential to damage international 
competitiveness, particularly that of the energy-intensive industry based in 
an Annex I country.  
 
 
 
There are several challenges. First, it has been argued that there are 
not so many sectors that would suit this mechanism, if the scope is 
primarily aimed at industry sectors. However, broadly speaking, the scope 
of sectoral crediting could cover three main sectors: electricity generation, 
Box 4. Key elements of the EU proposal for a sectoral crediting mechanism 
The new mechanism aims: 
•  To introduce a more comprehensive and wide-ranging price signal, 
i.e. a price that reaches individual installations in a particular 
economic sector; 
•  To have a greater environmental ambition level and move beyond the 
pure offsetting nature in the current CDM; 
•  To be administratively less cumbersome and give rise to lower 
transaction costs than the project-based CDM; 
•  To initially concentrate on the power sector and those economic 
activities that are subject to global competition, e.g. steel, cement and 
aluminium; 
•  To earn credits against an ambitious technical benchmark per sector 
and 
•  To facilitate a move to a comprehensive multi-sectoral cap-and-trade 
system. 
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industry (e.g. cement, aluminium, iron and steel) and other sectors subject 
to ‘policies and measures’ (e.g. transport).18 Second, baseline setting would 
need to take into account specific circumstances of a country, sector, or 
technology since one approach or method does not fit all national or 
sectoral circumstances, hence, ‘one size does not fit all’. 19  The  third 
challenge is capacity-building. The most advanced developing countries 
can benefit from the scheme not only because they have developed key 
industry sectors that are targeted but also because they possess the 
technical capacity and data required. There has been an attempt to use 
sectoral proposal templates as a capacity-building tool. 20  The  fourth 
challenge is institutional set-up (see Schneider & Cames, 2009).21 Given that 
sectoral crediting relies on high-quality data and information about 
technologies, cooperation between governments and industry is crucial. 
The latter could facilitate benchmarking and data collection, ensure the 
high standard of MRV (measurement, reporting and verification) and 
advise on national implementation process. 
Moreover, it is not clear at this stage what role the private sector can 
play in sectoral crediting and how to create incentives for their 
participation. In addition, it would be important to consider ways to reduce 
or share risks for private investors. 
A few remaining questions are how to avoid possible confusion 
between sectoral crediting as a new mechanism and sectoral benchmarking 
in the CDM and whether sectoral crediting based on no-lose targets can co-
exist with the current CDM or other flexible mechanisms. There is a risk of 
                                                      
18 See e.g. the study on sectoral approaches financed by the European Commission 
(DG Enterprise), http://www.ccapeurope.org; Baron et al. (2007); IEA (2009) and 
Amatayakul et al. (2008). 
19D. Klein, “Data issues in sectoral approaches“, presentation at the Tokyo 
workshop as part of the study on sectoral approaches, 25 February 2009 
(http://www.ccapeurope.org). 
20  M. Jung et al, “Sectoral Proposal Templates: Overview and lessons learned”, 
presentation at the Brussels workshop as part of the study on sectoral approaches, 
17 September 2008 (see http://www.ccapeurope.org). 
21 One idea is to use existing bodies such as the CDM regulatory bodies (e.g. EB, 
DOE, Designated National Authorities (DNAs)). Another idea is to establish a new 
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double-counting between an existing local CDM project and a new project 
for sectoral crediting. One solution would be to deduct the number of CERs 
issued to the local CDM project from those issued to the sectoral scheme; 
another would be to prohibit the implementation of such local projects 
(Sterk, 2008). Sectoral crediting could be seen as a parallel initiative to JI 
and the EU-ETS. Another question is how the mechanism will be 
structured to encourage upfront private sector investment. 
3.4  Sectoral trading 
Sectoral trading refers to a cap-and-trade scheme applied to a whole sector 
or a sub-sector within a country (e.g. an ETS for aviation), and in this 
respect it can be regarded as a step beyond sectoral crediting based on no-
lose targets towards an economy-wide cap-and-trade. Such a move can be 
done by gradually tightening the negotiated baselines and converting them 
into absolute caps. If the baselines are already expressed in absolute terms, 
such a conversion would be technically easier.  
Sectoral trading aims at addressing countries that are not yet ready to 
take on binding national targets but are prepared to take on binding targets 
in key sectors, such as power and industry. Emissions allowances will be 
allocated to the host country’s government, reflecting binding sectoral 
targets. Governments will be responsible for reducing emissions in 
particular sectors to a pre-determined level. This level would be the basis 
for cap-setting in a domestic sectoral trading scheme. The government will 
then decide how to allocate emissions allowances within the relevant 
sector. If the government has taken on a binding target for the sector, the 
sectoral cap-and-trade scheme would be mandatory in principle. There are 
a number of challenges: for example, boundary setting and consideration of 
specific circumstances of a country, a sector, or a technology in baseline 
setting. Presumably the industry structure and boundary may vary from 
country to country, as pointed out in the context of sectoral crediting.  | 45 
 
 
4.  OBJECTIVES OF FUTURE MECHANISMS 
uture mechanisms should be able to meet a number of objectives. 
They could help to address outstanding problems (e.g. 
competitiveness and leakage; transparency and accountability in 
governance; equity) while enhancing the strengths of existing mechanisms 
(e.g. robust price signals).  
T h i s  C E P S  T a s k  F o r c e  h a s  f o r m u l a t e d  t h r e e  s e t s  o f  o b j e c t i v e s  t h a t  
reformed and new mechanisms should meet: 
•  environmental integrity (e.g. limiting pure-offsetting, additionality); 
•  enhanced investment (e.g. integration with national strategies, 
leverage of private investments) and 
•  institutional strength at the international level (e.g. integrity of 
mechanisms with the overall architecture, compatibility between 
mechanisms and coherence of the framework). 
These three objectives are considered to be common to the four 
mechanism options introduced in this report (reform CDM, reform JI, 
sectoral crediting, sectoral trading), although their relevance varies across 
options. While there are other equally important objectives such as 
contributing to sustainable development, competitiveness and a level-
playing field, they would not necessarily apply to all mechanisms or all 
sectors (e.g. the CDM aimed to contribute to sustainable development, 
whereas sectoral approaches attempt to soften competitiveness concerns as 
well as improve environmental integrity).  
This chapter compares the four mechanism options examined in the 
previous chapter in light of the three objectives for reformed and new 
mechanisms.  
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4.1  Environmental integrity 
The environmental integrity of the so-called ‘project’ (or ‘baseline-and-
credit’) mechanisms, especially the CDM, rests on their assurance for 
additionality and limiting pure offsetting. One of the ongoing controversies 
relates to the current CDM as being largely offsetting, as section 2.1 
mentioned. While ultimately environmental integrity is primarily a matter 
of the stringency of a country’s commitment or an installation’s cap in 
addition to the nature of a flexible mechanism, it would be important to 
reduce or eliminate perverse incentives to weaken the commitment or cap. 
In response, mechanism or design options rewarding ambitious and 
dynamic baseline levels (e.g. sectoral benchmarking in the CDM for the 
cement sector) would be a good starting point, including some measure of 
international average or best practice in environment.  
Such options are offered by the reformed CDM and sectoral crediting. 
In the CDM reform, offset crediting could, in time, be limited to LDCs and 
additionality needs to be ensured. JI and sectoral trading are less 
problematic because in theory they incorporate direct and explicit links to 
AAUs, (i.e. the AAU/ERU link for JI and binding sectoral targets/binding 
domestic caps for the trading). However, this depends on the level of initial 
allocation of these units in light of environmental integrity.  
4.2  Enhanced investment 
Improvements in general investment conditions would help developing 
countries attract more private investments in low-carbon technology and 
abatement actions. A starting point would be the two priorities: removing 
barriers to investments and trade in low-carbon energy technologies and 
enhancing economic incentives.22  For the former, priorities may include 
reducing risk and uncertainty, stabilising the legal or regulatory 
framework, developing necessary infrastructure, increasing the scope for a 
role by the private sector, respecting intellectual property rights, and 
providing access to financial resources, information, expertise and know-
how. For the latter, key drivers may include the prospects for market 
development and expansion with profitability, some form of tax reduction, 
                                                      
22   The expansion of investments and trade in cleaner energy technology is 
promoted by the Asia-Pacific Partnership for Clean Development and Climate 
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exemption or other incentives to reduce investment costs, a longer 
commitment period beyond five years matching investment cycles, and the 
possibility to phase-in advanced technologies. Leveraging investment 
depends on i) improving the investment conditions, in particular 
improving the predictability of the processes and their time scales of 
operation and ii) making clear that there will be a rate of return for private 
sector capital. It is vital that confidence is not lost in the operation and 
future viability of the mechanisms, particularly in times of economic crisis 
where many ‘safer’ opportunities exist for investments. 
It is crucial for governments to address the two priorities – removal of 
barriers to investments and trade as well as enhancing economic incentives 
– and articulate how to incorporate specific mechanism options for given 
purposes in its national strategy or action plan for a low-carbon economy. 
In this regard, all four mechanism options – reformed CDM, reformed JI, 
sectoral crediting and sectoral trading – would be compatible with and 
could be incorporated into host governments’ national strategies or action 
plans. Sectoral crediting and sectoral trading depend on the host country’s 
ability to implement intermediary, national schemes. In general cap-and-
trade types of emissions trading (e.g. sectoral trading) could leverage a 
greater scale of financial flows or private investment than other baseline-
and-credit type options (reformed CDM, reformed JI or sectoral crediting). 
In the latter there is an expectation that CDM will be scaled up on a 
programmatic or sectoral basis. 
A particular issue that must be addressed for the future sectoral 
crediting or sectoral trading mechanisms is the role of private investment. 
Initial presentations of these mechanisms indicate substantial roles for host 
governments in introducing policies and measures to deliver the agreed 
commitments, as well as in dispersing the credits gained through emissions 
reductions. The means by which for a private investor to invest in a sector 
(rather than an individual project, as in the current CDM) and the ability to 
receive credits are, at present, unclear. Furthermore, investors may attach 
more risk to contractual arrangements with governments for the delivery of 
credits than they do to those entered into with private entities. 
4.3  Institutional strength 
The third and last objective focuses on the ability of a mechanism to 
function well on its own, to work together with other mechanisms and to fit 
in with any future architecture devised. First, to work better, simpler rules 48 | OBJECTIVES OF FUTURE MECHANISMS 
and procedures should be adopted and complexity eschewed. Second, to 
work together, there should be an increase in coherence or compatibility 
between different mechanisms, old and new, and those running in parallel. 
Market linking issues, including ways to make new mechanisms work 
alongside existing mechanisms, are crucial in the development of the 
carbon market. Lastly, there should be more integrity between individual 
mechanisms and the overall architecture.  
In addition, there is the element of timing, especially in transition 
between mechanisms: the evolution of existing mechanisms and the 
introduction of new ones, especially the end-dates for access to the 
mechanisms. 
Policy-makers are expected to provide more clarity about the 
direction, pathways and duration of the transition, which would be key to 
maintaining and increasing private investments. One useful approach 
would be to set up a long-term domestic regulatory framework ideally 
backed by an international agreement that could be adapted to changes in 
circumstances. Such a long-term framework should be able to provide 
stakeholders with some clarity about access to market mechanisms and 
improve predictability about their investment conditions.  
At the same time, it is important to provide rules on the treatment of 
double-counting, as it is likely that more than one mechanism will operate 
simultaneously. Reforms should be practical with a view to making 
existing mechanisms work better in rules and procedures. Reformed 
mechanisms should be ready to implement until new mechanisms are put 
in place. While reformed mechanisms are up and running, support for 
capacity-building aimed at new mechanisms must be provided as it takes a 
long time for new mechanisms to become operational, e.g. benchmarks 
must be set and agreement reached on where to set the benchmarks and 
how much flexibility is to be allowed. New mechanisms should be simple, 
functional, sound in cost-performance for participating companies (e.g. a 
company’s cost of participation should not outweigh the expected benefits) 
and profitable for the investors. 
One outstanding question concerns the circumstances and timing 
under which mechanism options could be introduced or phased out, for 
example, with a sun-set clause. A move to a more advanced mechanism can 
be achieved through a number of design options, for example, baseline-
setting and eligibility criteria. There could be several paths built upon 
existing and new mechanisms, both fast track and otherwise, for moving 
forward. One suggestion (European Commission, 2009a and b; Burniaux et FLEXIBLE MECHANISMS IN SUPPORT OF A NEW CLIMATE CHANGE REGIME | 49 
 
al., 2009) would be to evolve sectoral crediting based on no-lose targets, 
gradually tightening the negotiated baselines and converting them into 
absolute caps for sectoral trading, and expanding them across sectors while 
strengthening the caps. A national low-carbon strategy would be the basis 
for receiving external finance to put the crediting scheme into practice. 
Another suggestion explores the possibility for converting the CDM into JI 
and inviting new Annex I countries and sectors to participate. Clarification 
of these paths could offer investors more predictability on which to base 
their investment decisions. However, any proposal first needs to reflect the 
explicit preferences, capacities, needs as well as different circumstances of 
developing countries at the early stage. 50 | 
 
 
5.  CONCLUDING REMARKS 
his overview of existing and new mechanism options has pointed to 
common directions for future flexible mechanisms.  
CDM and JI reforms give priority to enhancing efficiency of 
administration and transparency of governance. Predictability and 
consistency in decision-making will also facilitate the management of the 
entry of projects in the pipelines. Both expansion of the scope beyond 
project activities and the wider use of alternative, conservative and simpler 
approaches like benchmarks will also contribute to reducing delays in 
registration and issuance attributed to the additionality requirement. 
Among others, sectoral crediting and sectoral trading could 
contribute to the development of the carbon market by addressing GHG 
emissions from key sectors in developing countries. However, each 
mechanism faces a number of challenges including the difficulty of taking 
into account that variance in industry structure and boundary conditions 
that exists across countries. Moreover, the involvement of private investors 
requires further exploration. 
For higher environmental integrity, reformed CDM and sectoral 
crediting reward ambitious and dynamic baselines (e.g. sectoral 
benchmarking in the CDM for the cement sector, although the process for 
developing such baselines under sectoral crediting is still unclear). JI and 
sectoral trading incorporate direct and explicit links to AAUs, but the 
environmental integrity of such links depends on how the AAUs are 
initially allocated. Furthermore, monitoring, reporting and verification 
must be at least equivalent to that developed under the current JI/CDM 
regimes, as a tonne of emissions reduction will have an equivalent 
monetary value to the reduction of a tonne under JI/CDM. 
To enhance investment, all the four options – reformed CDM, 
reformed JI, sectoral crediting and sectoral trading – could be incorporated 
T FLEXIBLE MECHANISMS IN SUPPORT OF A NEW CLIMATE CHANGE REGIME | 51 
 
into a developing country’s national strategy or action plan. Sectoral 
trading could leverage a greater scale of financial flows than the other three 
mechanisms. 
Lastly, a comparison of the mechanism options in terms of their 
respective institutional strength was not conclusive, but the exercise did 
lead to indicative suggestions for further exploration. These included the 
development of sectoral crediting based on no-lose targets into an 
economy-wide cap-and-trade emissions trading scheme via sectoral 
trading, and the possibility to convert the CDM into JI. 
In conclusion, these mechanism options could play different roles in a 
new climate change regime to reflect the different motivations identified at 
the beginning of this report: GHG emissions reductions, development of a 
carbon market, technology diffusion and financing. The future agenda may 
include a stronger focus on the potential contribution of flexible 
mechanisms to technology diffusion and an analysis of the interactions, 
including linking, between different mechanisms. In order to engage 
potential investors, however, it is vital that early clarification is received on 
the operation and scope of the reformed and new mechanisms as well as on 
the timetable for their operations and the transition between the different 
mechanisms. It is also essential that potential investors receive sufficient 
information to allow them to forecast future supply/demand balances. 52 | 
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ANNEX 1. ACRONYMS AND TECHNICAL TERMS 
AAU  Assigned Amount Unit (under Kyoto Protocol 
international emissions trading) 
AIE Accredited  Independent  Entity 
APP  Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and 
Climate 
BAU Business  as  usual 
CCAP  Center for Clean Air Policy (Washington-based think 
tank)  
CCC  Climate Change Capital, London 
CCS  Carbon capture and storage/sequestration  
CDM  Clean Development Mechanism (a mechanism under 
Article 12 of the Kyoto Protocol) 
CEPS  Centre for European Policy Studies 
CER  Certified Emissions Reduction (under the CDM) 
CH4 Methane 
CMP  Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the 
Parties to the Kyoto Protocol 
COP  Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC  
CO2 Carbon  dioxide 
CO2e / CO2eq  Carbon dioxide equivalent  
CSI  Cement Sustainability Initiative (under the auspices of 
the World Business Council for Sustainable 
Development) 
DEFRA   Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, 
UK Government 
DNA   Designated National Authority 
DOE   Designated Operational Entity 
DVM   Determination and Verification Manual 
EB   Executive Board (of the CDM) 
EBRD   European Bank for Reconstruction and Development 56 | ANNEX 1. ACRONYMS AND TECHNICAL TERMS 
ECN  Energy research Center of the Netherlands 
eq / e  Equivalent 
ERU   Emissions Reduction Unit (under the JI) 
ETS  Emissions Trading System/Scheme 
EUA   EU Emissions Allowance 
EU ETS / EU-ETS EU Emissions Trading Scheme 
GDP  Gross Domestic Product 
GHG  Greenhouse Gas (the six gases covered by the Kyoto 
Protocol, CO2, CH4, N2O, HFCs, PFCs and SF6)  
GIS  Green Investment Scheme 
GNR   Getting the Numbers Right (a CSI initiative) 
Gt  Gigatonne (billion metric tonnes) 
HCFC-22  Difluorochloromethane = Chlorodifluoromethane (also 
known as Freon 22 and R-22) 
HCFCs Hydrochlorofluorocarbons 
HFCs Hydrofluorcarbons 
IDDRI  Institute for Sustainable Development and International 
Relations, Paris (Institut du développement durable et 
des relations internationals) 
IET   International Emissions Trading 
IEA  International Energy Agency 
IETA  International Emissions Trading Association 
IPCC  Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
JI   Joint Implementation (under Article 6 of the Kyoto 
Protocol) 
JISC   Joint Implementation Supervisory Committee (of the 
UN) 
KP Kyoto  Protocol 
LDCs  Least Developed Countries 
LULUCF   Land Use, Land Use Change and Forestry 
MRV  Measurement, Reporting and Verification 
Mt  Megatonne (million metric tonnes) 
N2O   Nitrous Oxide 
NAMA Nationally  Appropriate Mitigation Action FLEXIBLE MECHANISMS IN SUPPORT OF A NEW CLIMATE CHANGE REGIME | 57 
 
OECD  Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development 
PoA  Programme of Activities 
PBL   Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency 
PDD   Project Design Document 
PFCs   Perfluorocarbons  
REDD   Reducing deforestation and forest degradation in 
developing countries  
RIT   Registration and Issuance Team 
SB-30  Thirtieth session of the UNFCCC subsidiary bodies 
SD-PAMs  Sustainable Development Policies and Measures 
SF6   Sulfur Hexafluoride 
SIDS   Small Island Developing States 
tCO2e / tCO2eq  Metric tonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent  
UN United  Nations 
UNEP   United Nations Environment Programme 
UNFCCC  United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change 
WBCSD  World Business Council for Sustainable Development 
ZEW  Centre for European Economic Research, Mannheim 
(Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschungen) 58 | 
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European Policy Director 
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Managing Director 
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Vice President, Carbon Business 
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